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Cloud computing provides network based access to computing and data storage services on a pay per usage model. Cloud provides
better utilization of resources and hence a reduced service access cost to individuals. Cloud services include software as a service,
platform as a service, and infrastructure as a service. Cloud computing virtually and dynamically distributes the computing and
data resources to a variety of users, based on their needs, with the use of virtualization technologies. As Cloud computing is a
shared facility and is accessed remotely, it is vulnerable to various attacks including host and network based attacks (Brown 2012,
andGrance 2009) and hence requires immediate attention.This paper identifies vulnerabilities responsible for well-known network
based attacks on cloud and does a critical analysis on the security measures available in cloud environment. This paper focuses on
a nonconventional technique for securing cloud network from malicious insiders and outsiders with the use of network profiling.
With network profiling, a profile is created for each virtual machine (VM) in cloud that describes network behavior of each cloud
user (an assigned VM).The behavior gathered is then used for determination (detection) of network attacks on cloud. The novelty
of the approach lies in the early detection of network attacks with robustness and minimum complexity. The proposed technique
can be deployed with minimal changes to existing cloud environment. An initial prototype implementation is verified and tested
on private cloud with a fully functional implementation under progress.
1. Introduction
Cloud computing according to National Institute of Stan-
dards and Technology (NIST) is a service that is provided
in the form of computing power and data storage, remotely
over internet (network based access) with minimal efforts
for resource allocation, management, and release [1]. The US
National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) has
captured five essential cloud characteristics which are [1, 2]
(1) on-demand self-service,
(2) ubiquitous network access,
(3) resource pooling,
(4) rapid elasticity,
(5) measured service.
Cloud computing provides three major services to its
users at various layers of computing. These include [1] the
following:
(1) software as a service, where a user buys software and
application services from cloud service provider in
the form of readily and frequently used software such
as word processing and data processing software with
user having control over its usage but not over the
software working and operations,
(2) platform as a service, where a user is provided with
a platform that can vary from backend supports (for
user’s own software to run over cloud vendor’s space)
to provisions for having support for uploading and
using third party software on vendor’s platform.Here,
a user has full control on which software to run and
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how the software will behave but has dependency
on the platform support such as compilers, operating
system, and execution frameworks provided by cloud
vendor,
(3) infrastructure as a service, where a user will have
a decent amount of control over the computing
infrastructure and storage and he can decide which
platform compilers, operating systems, and so forth
and software he needs to deploy with full control over
them.
With major service providers on the field such as Google,
Rackspace, Amazon, and Microsoft cloud computing is one
of the most popular forms of computing utilized by users
nowadays [3]. The users vary from small companies that
wish to use computing and storage infrastructures on a pay
per usage model (generally infrastructure and platforms for
deploying their own software products) to normal everyday
internet users who want to use services such as software,
data storage, and platform as a service remotely over internet
[3]. The major facility that Cloud computing provides and
that makes it different is that it is highly scalable form of
computing and can be allocated, reallocated, and released
with minimal managerial efforts [1].
The base of Cloud computing lies over virtualization
technologies that provide a way to dynamically allocate
virtual replicas of physical resources, including memory,
processor, and other computing and storage resources. Many
of the virtualization software provide facility for creating
virtual replicas of physical resources including VMware [4],
XEN, and Virtual Box. The virtual replicas provide a way
through which users can access the single physical resource
simultaneously which eventually increases the resource uti-
lization. As Cloud computing is a remotely accessed form of
service and is used by various users, it is vulnerable to attacks
ranging from host based attacks to network based attacks and
attacks on data storage [5–9].
Cloud environment is vulnerable to a large number of
attacks because of the vulnerabilities present in it due to its
distributed nature [5, 6]. We have identified vulnerabilities
that lead to threats for cloud network environment. The
motivation for network attack detection lies in the fact that
there is a rapid increase in the number of network based
attacks in cloud. We have gathered the statistics of well-
known network attacks on cloud that are launched recently.
These include the following.
(1) The Dropbox (which is a well-known cloud based file
sharing facility) getting hacked in July 2012 [10], in
this attack, the user personal information which was
hacked by attacker from third party websites is used
to access Dropbox accounts of users. According to
Dropbox, the user name and passwords stolen from
other websites about a user are tested on Dropbox
accounts. In a large number of the attempts, hackers
got success.
(2) Attack on Sony PlayStation network which is the
second largest attack in US history: this attack took
place onMay 13, 2011 and has breached online data of
Sony PlayStation network [11].
(3) Attack over Amazon EC2 cloud: this attack took place
inOctober 2009 and caused Bit Bucket’s servers down
for 19 hours [12, 13].
(4) Stratfor (a well-known geopolitical analysis service
provider) found its servers breached in the last quar-
ter of 2011 [14].
(5) In 2011, an attack on Epsilon (an email marketing
company) led to leakage of user credentials such as
their names and email addresses through penetrating
their customer databases [15].
All such cloud network attacks are a combination of well-
known basic network attacks in a specialized manner. We
have categorized all such attacks that play as ingredients
for specialized cloud network attacks. The well-known and
possible network attacks from malicious insiders, users, and
outsiders on cloud and the vulnerabilities associated with
them are shown in Table 1.
2. Related Work
2.1. The Present Scenario. Various different measures to
improve the security of network of either distributed or
standalone systems are already known to be researched, pro-
posed, and deployed. Some of the measures include firewalls,
network intrusion detection, and prevention systems.
The concept of intrusion detection was known since past
and was first proposed by a well-known researcher named
Anderson in 1980s [30]. Since the concept was very effective
in increasing the security measures of end systems, it gets
popularized and now is used and applied in various domains
of security.
Since past various intrusion detection and information
security approaches for securing Cloud have been proposed
and are in practice [27, 31–42], but the concept of net-
work intrusion detection and prevention systems and its
deployment strategies over cloud infrastructure, which will
be efficient and lightweight, is still going on, because cloud
vendors are also interested in a solution that can be deployed
and maintained at low cost [5]. Summary of some of the
research work carried out in the area of network intrusion
detection and prevention in cloud is as follows.
Table 2 provides an abstract description of the work done
by the researchers in the area of network intrusion detection
in cloud. The table describes the problem areas identified by
the researches which are followed by the brief description of
the scheme. The table also provides information about the
drawbacks of the schemes over cloud with their performance
analysis.
2.2. Research Gaps Identified
(1) Existing schemes that do network intrusion detection
without VM Profiling are complex as they look for all
kinds of attacks on every VM irrespective of the fact
that some VMs never launch them.
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Table 1: Cloud network attacks and vulnerabilities.
Cloud network attack Source Description Effects Vulnerabilitiesand root cause
DoS and DDoS [4]
SYN flooding attack (TCP
SYN flood)
Smurf attack (ICMP
flood)
Ping of death (ICMP
flood)
Low rate
Denial-of-service attacks
(TCP’s slow-time-scale
dynamics of RTO)
Outside attackers,
malicious insiders,
and Cloud users
This is an attack over cloud
networking environment
that either disrupt or
degrade the service or
make the network unusable
for the Cloud users through
unwanted packet flooding
Degrade network service to
cloud users or completely
make it unusable during
the time it is active
Vulnerabilities in network
protocols,
undetected spoofing
not handling packets
flooding of a particular type
TCP session hijacking [16]
Outside attackers
(generally), but can
also be fired from
malicious users
and insiders
In this type of attack, an
attacker steals, or hijacks, a
session between a trusted
client on cloud and the
cloud network server
Can disrupt the normal
usage of cloud services and
will affect the quality of
service
User session secret
information can be
accessible through the
session hijacking activities
Failing to detect IP
spoofing
Network sniffing to obtain
TCP session information
Reused IP addresses [17]
In cloud dynamically
provisioning of network
resources, the IP address
associated with a user is
assigned to a new user
when the old user moves
out of a network
Some other user will access
the data as the address still
resides in the DNS caches
Some attacks that are
targeted on the IP address
of the previous user cause
the new user to face the
problem
Delay in management of
DNS caches
Failing to identify frequent
communications
DNS attacks [17]
Outside attackers,
malicious insiders,
and malicious
Cloud users
If through some means a
malicious user or insider is
able to change the internal
mapping the naive users
will be directed to
malicious locations for
getting access to resources
If the mapping of cloud’s
login website is
manipulated in global DNS
which is considered as a
change in external mapping
will result in loss of user’s
personal information
because of entering it into
deceptive websites
Failing to detect malicious
communication with
privileged facilities such as
DNS
Network penetration [18]
IP random options, SMB
session mixing, TCP
urgent pointer, and
MSRPC object reference
Outside attackers
(generally),
but can also be
fired from
malicious insiders
and users
Network penetration is an
attack on cloud, in which
the attacker tries to
penetrate the network
infrastructure by evading
the network security
measures through
advanced network evasion
techniques
Some of the techniques
include port scanning
which looks for specific
open ports and gathers
information about the
system, so that further
specific network attacks can
be launched
Vulnerabilities in network
protocols
Fragmentation attack [19]
Tiny fragment attack,
overlapping fragment
attack
Outside attackers
(generally),
but can also be
launched by
malicious insiders
IP fragmentation is the
process of breaking down a
single IP datagram into
smaller packets to be
transmitted to different
locations. IP fragmentation
attacks use various IP
datagram fragmentations to
disguise their TCP packets
from a target’s IP filtering
devices
Uses all the memory
resources in a virtual
system and renders the
machine unusable
Undetected subverted
packets
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Table 1: Continued.
Cloud network attack Source Description Effects Vulnerabilitiesand root cause
Traffic analysis [20]
Deep packet inspection
Malicious insiders
and users
Traffic analysis is a
technique in which a
malicious user or insider
analyses the internal or
external network and
extracts the information
about the traffic by
interpreting the
unencrypted portions of
the traffic
This can help them to
launch more specific
attacks such as TCP
hijacking
Failing to identify
unidentified and bulk
unwanted communications
of insiders and cloud users
Passive eavesdropping [21] Malicious insiders
and Cloud users
The attacker simply
monitors the traffic
traversing the network and
may store it for further
analysis afterwards
This can help an insider to
obtain the information
about the network
utilization with the
information flowing over
network from a specific set
of cloud users that can help
them plan their activities
targeted over them
Failing to identify bulk
unauthorized
communication
Active eavesdropping [21] Malicious insiders,Cloud users
In this type of attack, the
attacker can either modify a
packet being transmitted or
can inject a new packet into
the cloud network
Goal of the attacker is to
prevent the authentic
packet from reaching its
authentic destination. One
of the methods for
accomplishing this is to
modify a packet’s
destination IP address
while in transit
Unidentified
communication sessions
(2) A Normal analysis which includes detection of all
well-known attacks from data coming from a large
group of VMs on cloud infrastructure is inefficient in
the sense that it will waste computing resources for
detection of attacks that never happen from a large
group of authentic virtual machines.
(3) Proposed schemes that deploy IDS at individual
virtual machines are vulnerable to host manipulation
attacks. Host can subvert the individual IDS or sen-
sors deployed at any virtual machine which will make
it difficult to detect network intrusions.
(4) Intrusion detection systems which are either signa-
ture based or anomaly based are not robust and
efficient. This is because signature based detection
cannot detect new attacks on the cloudwhile anomaly
based detection systems are not very accurate. Hence,
a combination of both is a requirement.
(5) There is no concept of ranked detection earlier, that
can possibly decrease the amount of time it takes for
detecting and responding back to network intrusions
in cloud.
The above finding demonstrates the fact that there is an
immediate need for a new concept of network intrusion
detection for cloud environment that will take the benefits
of both signature and anomaly based detection systems with
added use of VM profiling that will make it efficient low
cost andmore responsive in case of frequent and well-known
network attacks.
3. The Profile Based Network IDS
Based on the research gaps identified in previous techniques,
we have provided a novel architecture for securing cloud
towards network based attacks. Our proposed profile based
network intrusion detection system is a novel architecture for
detecting intrusion from virtual machines (internal entities
such as malicious cloud users and insiders) and external
entities (outside attackers) on a cloud infrastructure. Our
research focuses on providing robust security to cloud
network with minimized cost. The cost is in terms of
computational power, storage, and communication cost. We
have designed and developed a prototype implementation
of profile based (anomaly cum signature based) intrusion
prevention system for cloud networking infrastructure that
will reside in privileged domain and will detect, prevent, and
respond to commonly known cloud network attacks.
In our proposed architecture, the total network traffic at
privileged domain is filtered based on VM’s IP addresses.
Network intrusion detection is performed on the packets
coming from a particular virtualmachine based on its profile.
A VM profile describes the attacks that are possible on it for,
for example, a VM profile may have entries (thresholds) that
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Table 2: Description of previous techniques.
Title Problem areasidentified Brief description Drawbacks Performance analysis
A cooperative IDS
Framework for Cloud
computing networks [22]
To reduce the
impact of denial of
service (DoS) and
distributed denial
of service (DDoS)
attacks, to
introduce
cooperation in
intrusion detection
system (IDS)
Idea of cooperative IDS in
cloud
IDS deployed in each
Cloud computing region
IDS cooperates and
exchanges alerts to reduce
DDoS impacts
This architecture provides
intrusion detection only at
Cloud provider’s end and
not at client’s end.
Increase little effort
compared with intrusion
prevention system
(SNORT) but prevent the
system from single point of
failure
Intrusion detection in the
cloud [23]
Operator of the
IDS should be the
user, not the
administrator
An extensible IDS
management architecture is
proposed, with several
distributed intrusion
detection sensors deployed
and a single central control
and management unit
The output of different
sensors is not standardized
due to different
technologies and formats
Extensibility, efficient
management, and
compatibility to
virtualization based context
Multilevel IDS and log
management in Cloud
computing [24]
More secure cloud,
more resources for
computation
Huge amount of
log entries
Method is proposed that
enables Cloud computing
system to achieve both
effectiveness of using the
system resource and
strength of the security
service without tradeoff
between them
The solution is cost
effective; however, such
reduction in network and
file monitoring modules
require consideration for
complete solution
However, reduction in
resources when complete
solution is deployed will be
a question
Effective resource usage
and economical cost
reduction
Integrating a Network IDS
into an open source Cloud
computing environment
[25]
Risks introduce
due to resource
sharing
requirement
Misconfigured
remote data storage
which exposes
user’s private data
The issue of detecting
denial-of-service attacks
targeting session initiation
protocol (SIP) flooding
attack instances targeting
services hosted within a
cloud is addressed
The detection process is
expensive, overloaded
Cluster controller (CC) is a
bottleneck and during the
attack other virtual
machines (VMs) running
concurrently with the
attacked one underwent
performance degradation
When a single IDS is placed
close to the CC, it is able to
monitor all traffic flowing
to and from the cloud but
the single IDS is heavily
loaded thus allowing for
coordinated attack
Twin Clouds: an
architecture for secure
Cloud computing [26]
For secure
computation
techniques
available
Fully
homomorphic
encryption—low
efficiency
Tamper-proof
hardware—
expensive and
relatively slow
The architecture proposed
consists of two clouds
(twins)
A trusted cloud and a
commodity cloud; further
the Security critical
operations are performed
by the trusted cloud and
performance critical
operations are performed
on encrypted data by the
commodity cloud
The concept of division of
operations and its handling
by different clouds require
major concerns
The deployment and
maintenance of such
architecture of cloud will
require noticeable changes
in the underlying
infrastructure that may
raise questions on its
performance and
acceptance in real-world
scenario
Maximum utilization of
expensive resources of the
trusted cloud
High loads of queries are
processed on demand by
commodity cloud
A VMM based intrusion
prevention system in
Cloud computing
environment [27]
File integrity
monitoring,
network defense
Proposed VMFence in a
virtualization based Cloud
computing environment,
which is used to monitor
network flow and file
integrity in real time
More computationally
complex as it checks for
attack patterns from data
coming via all VMs
connected to the privileged
domain
Useful for a virtualization
based Cloud computing
environment, especially for
multicore CPU
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Table 2: Continued.
Title Problem areasidentified Brief description Drawbacks Performance analysis
Intrusion analysis with
deep packet inspection:
increasing efficiency of
packet based
investigations [28]
Efficient deep
packet inspection
scheme
Described the effectiveness
of a utility that was
developed to improve
retrospective packet
analysis which was tested
against actual data center
traffic from a large ISP
providing cloud services
The concept of deep packet
inspection for network
security attack detection
works efficiently for small
and simpler enterprise
networks
Deep packet inspection
scheme will demand a
decent amount of resources
which will make the
concept have concerns in its
real-time implementations
Intrusion detection
system in Cloud
computing environment
[29]
Instance based
IDS. reducing load
Proposed IDS in which
each instance of the IDS
has to monitor only a single
user
Advantage of having fewer
loads on single IDS, and
hence, the number of
packets dropped will also
be less
The host can subvert the
individual IDS deployed at
any VM which will then
not be able to detect
network intrusions
Individual IDS must have
to follow the same set of
standards for information
communication
dictate that a TCP SYN flooding attack is frequent from it to
other VMs on the cloud infrastructure, or it is facing SYN
floods from the external world or from other Cloud VMs.
This information is gathered by the analysis of signatures of
TCP SYN flooding attack in VM network traffic for a period
of time. This information is gathered during the initial phase
when the VM is assigned to a user and is working in its
normal behaviour.
It contains parameters that describe VM’s normal incom-
ing and outgoing network traffic behaviour. Hence, whenever
packets coming from that VM are collected, they are first
analysed for TCP SYN flooding attack, if they are the most
frequent attack pattern on that VM. This profile also ranks
attacks on the basis of their frequency for, for example, if a
particular VM is responsible for TCP SYN flooding attack
more frequently than any other attack that is launched from
it (in previous history), then it will be analysed first for
TCP SYN flooding attack patterns in the traffic than for any
other attack pattern.The historical information resides in the
profile that ranks the attack patterns and is dynamic in nature.
The recently detected attack signature is ranked the highest
one in the profile, and the network traffic is detected for attack
patterns based on the pattern rank. Hence, the attacks, which
are more frequent will be analysed first as they are highly
ranked than other signatures in the attack signature db. Also
VM profiling helps in developing efficient IDS as VM’s traffic
is not analysed for all the attacks but only for those attacks
which are frequent from them.
This profile of well-known attacks from a virtual machine
is created on the basis of anomaly detection component.
When a virtual machine is assigned and allocated, the virtual
machine traffic is analysed through an anomaly detection
component. If an anomaly is detected, the profile of that
virtual machine is updated with the attack pattern detected.
When an entry is made for that attack in the profile of a
virtual machine, the analysis component is informed not to
analyse the traffic for known attack patterns on the data
coming from that virtual machine for adding them in VM
profile as they already exists in the database. But anomaly
detection components update the rank of the attack based on
the frequency or probability of the attack from VM network
behaviour.This anomaly detection component also stores the
network characteristic of a particular VM such as bandwidth
utilization, packet loss rate, and connection type (secure or
not) with signatures of well-known attacks possible or can be
launched from that VM as obtained from attack signature db.
Our proposed scheme is deployed at cloud administrator
or the privileged cloud service monitor virtual machine
which administers and detects attack patterns from other
virtual machines allocated to cloud users. Our analysis
shows that VM profile based detection increases efficiency
and robustness compared to other intrusion detection or
prevention architectures. VM profile based network intru-
sion detection system component collects network packets
coming from virtual interfaces of various VMs. As the virtual
network interfaces of virtualmachines are connected through
virtual bridge which privileged domain can access, installing
a network packet sniffer on privileged domain is an easiest
way to sniff packets for detecting intrusions. Our scheme
for detecting intrusions is different from existing network
intrusion detection systems as it takes care of virtual machine
profile while analysing network packets for intrusion. Vir-
tual machine profile defines what network attacks a virtual
machine is vulnerable to with thresholds of the frequent
attack patterns detected with their rank.
This helps the intrusion detection component to apply
checks only for those intrusions that are possible on a partic-
ular virtual machine. VM profile creation, management, and
updation will be performed by policy manager component
of S-ProIPS. The efficiency is achieved by checking attack
patterns on network traffic from a VM only for frequently
happening or most probable attacks instead of searching all
attack patterns possible. Hence, this will reduce rigorous
detection for all attack patterns on the data coming from all
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VMs even when a large population of VMs are not involved
and also are not a victim of such attacks in normal network
behaviour. The robustness is achieved as if some specific
attack happens over a VM for the first time, it will get
detected through the general network security checks applied
over data coming from all VMs and newly detected attacks
will be added to the VM profile with needed parameters
for further detection in future. A common database that
contains signature of basic attacks such as packet flooding
and which detects abnormal spikes in network traffic always
runs in background and contains minimal signatures for
pattern matching over all network data which makes this
technique a complete one. Our network intrusion detection
system is anomaly cum signature based. Whenever a new
VM is assigned to a user, its empty profile is created in the
VM profile db this is the database for storing VM profile
information.
VM profile is a tuple consisting of various features that
can be added automatically on the basis of intrusions a par-
ticular VM can launch or can suffer in cloud infrastructure.
Now, the network packets coming from VMs are analysed
for well-known network anomalies, and if an anomaly is
detected for a particular VM, its profile is updated with the
signature ID of the anomaly detected, which is present in the
attack signature db. If such a signature is absent in the attack
signature db, a new rule is added in the database. The VM
profile is also updated with the parameters needed to detect
such intrusions in future. For, for example, a scenario can
be as follows: a user (malicious insider or cloud user) does
a TCP SYN flooding DDoS attack from a particular VM.The
anomaly detection component detects the attack and updates
the empty profile of that user with signature ID of TCP SYN
flooding attack already present in Attack Signature db. One of
the parameters that can be added for such a frequency based
attack is threshold. Hence, the VM profile will have a defined
value of threshold for detecting a TCP SYN flooding attack
on it.
After profile creation, the data (network packets)
obtained from that virtual machine is looked for attacks
whose signatures are present in VM profile database and
match them with attack signature db, and if a match occurs,
it sends this information to detection and notification
component. After checking for known attacks in a ranked
manner, the data from that virtual machine is analysed for
anomalies other than signature entries present in attack
signature db. Detection and notification component (alert &
response) detect the type of attack based on the information
received from network intrusion detection system and
generate appropriate responses and notifications to handle
the attacks on cloud infrastructure. For, for example,
responses can be shutting down a particular VM, if it is
compromised and is generating DDoS attacks on cloud
infrastructure. Notification includes generating and sending
alerts to policy manager, so that policies for a particular
VM can be updated to prevent such attacks in future. Policy
manager (a part of alert & response generation component)
can generate new policies and signatures and send them to
VM profile db. Our goal is to develop an efficient intrusion
detection system in cloud and profile based detection is
a way to achieve the same. The design of the proposed
architecture is shown in Figure 1. The description of profile
based intrusion detection system working can be explained
in terms of stages which are as follows.
3.1. Initial Profile Creation Stage. This is the stage which
applies when newVMs are allocated to users in cloud. During
this stage, the whole traffic from the newly allocated VM
is passed through a rigorous checking of attack patterns
for a particular time period that can be configured by
the administrator. The attack patterns are present in attack
signature db. Based on the attack patterns found in the
traffic and based on the behavioral analysis of traffic patterns,
a profile for a particular VM is created that explains the
behavior of the network with probable attacks that it can
launch towards other VMs. It also infers the attacks that
are possible over that VM. The profile contains the unique
identity of attack patterns (referred from attack signature db)
that need to be checked on the traffic from that VM during
network intrusion detection stage (normal traffic flow path).
The description of the steps according to Figure 1 is as follows.
(1) In step 1, the network traffic coming from virtual net-
work is gathered at virtual network interface present
at the privileged VM.
(2) In step 2, the traffic is classified based on the virtual
private IP addresses allocated to VM and passed to
attack signature db. The attack signature db contains
signature of well-known attacks. The VM is analyzed
for patterns of attack that it can probably launch or
can be vulnerable to in future, based on the behavior
of network traffic it has. Like if, from the patterns
of attack signature db, it is matched and analyzed
that VM-1 generally fires a huge amount of ICMP
echo request queries in a small time on cloud VM,
there is a probability in future, that the VM can
try ping flooding over other cloud VMs. Another
example is when traffic of a VM has a huge amount
of queries to other systems on certain ports which
are used for obtaining system overview than there
exists a possibility that cloud user or insider may
try such queries over cloud operational systems such
as privileged VM and routers to obtain necessary
information for launching more severe attacks.
The profile db is updated with the signatures, so that the
system will be analyzed for those attack patterns in ranked
manner after which general attack patterns are searched for
by network intrusion detection system. The traffic is routed
to this path of a certain VM for a specified time interval that
can be configured for a particular VM to obtain necessary
profile information initially.The statistical behavioral analysis
of the traffic is also analyzed in this stage and stored in the db
that contains percentage of network bandwidth utilization,
packet loss ratio, percentage of unencrypted traffic flow,
and so forth. The major difference between the common
signature detection in background with signatures getting
matched throughVMprofile db is that thematching of attack
patterns at VM through VM profile db is fast and more
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Table 3: Demonstrating VM profile db for DDoS attack detection.
Attack pattern signature ID Max. threshold/𝑁 packets 𝑁 packets Rank for detection Attack frequency on VM (in times)
0x0001 (TCP SYN) 50 500 2 600
0x0012 (UDP flood) 100 400 1 750
0x0023 (ICMP flood) 70 500 3 500
Abstract view of private cloud deployment
VM-1
Protocol stack
VM-2
Protocol stack
VM-3
Protocol stack
Virtual network Virtual network
1 12
2
3
4
5
11
6
7
8
9 10
Virtual bridge
P-VM
Normal network traffic path
Initial network traffic path
during profile creation
Anomaly detection
componentProfile updation
Network intrusion
detection component
Profile updation and VM profile access path
Alert and
response
Privileged domain External network interface
External network
Attack
signature db
VM-1
profile db
VM-2
profile db
VM-3
profile db
Consulting db
VM-1, -2, and -3
Figure 1: The design of profile based network IDS.
frequent compared to the detection of common signature in
background at all traffics.This causes early detection of more
frequent attacks and also completes detection of other attacks
that are possible but with a saving of resources as the common
signaturematching is slow as it does rulematching operations
after every N packet. It means it searches for attack pattern
per N packet to identify intrusion saving resources in terms
of pattern matching operations.
(3) In step 3, the values obtained by analysis on the
network traffic are added to each individual profile of
the VMs.
(4) The example VM profile db is shown in Table 3
which is specific toDDoS attack detectionwhile Table
4 describes common attack signature db.
3.2. AnomalyDetection Stage. In the anomaly detection stage,
the data from the normal traffic path is obtained from the
virtual bridge of a VM and is checked consistently for other
probable attack pattern behavior. So in this way, robustness is
achieved, as after the VMprofile creation in the first stage, the
VMprofile is updated based on the attack patterns as detected
in the data coming from a particular VM.The concept lies in
ranking the attack patterns in the profile db to improve the
time taken for detection as the first attack pattern stored in
profile db of a VM is the most probable attack that can be
launched to or from other VMs. Also the statistical analysis
updates the behavioral measures of network traffic that help
in detecting anomalous network behavior over the traffic to
and from a particular VM.This helps in detecting intrusions
targeted from malicious outsiders towards that VM such as
DDoS attacks. The steps are described as follows.
(1) In step 4, the data coming from virtual bridge is
analyzed for network traffic coming from VMs for
new attack patterns from attack signature db. Also the
known attack patterns in the db are updated based
on the frequency of patterns found in the db, so if
their frequency is less, they are ranked less in attack
signature db for their detection.
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Table 4: Common attack signature db.
Attack pattern signature ID Behavior in abnormal traffic pattern Signature description for inspection (Perl)
0x0001 (TCP SYN) >40/500 packets If($TCP-> {“flags”}==SYN)
0x0023 (ICMP flood) >65/500 packets If($IPFRAME-> {proto}==IP PROTO ICMP)
3.3. Network Intrusion Detection Stage. In this stage, the
normal traffic flow path from virtual bridge is obtained and
analyzed for attack patterns from VM profile db. The traffic
of each VM is analyzed for its statistical network behavior
and attack pattern from its VM profile db. The anomaly
or attack pattern (behavioral anomaly detection and attack
pattern signature based detection) found is then reported to
the alert and response generation component. The alert and
response generation component generates alert and sends it
to the administrator for further analysis, while in background
it changes the ranking of attack patterns in the VM profile
db with their parameters updated for efficient and timely
detection of the similar attack for the next time. Various steps
in Figure 1 during this stage are described as follows.
(1) Step 5 shows the outgoing connection to network
intrusion detection component which will divide
the flow into individual VM traffic for performing
intrusion detection.
(2) Step 6 shows the access to VM profile db by the
network intrusion detection component. Based on
the specific attack patterns and their ranking in VM
profile db, the network intrusion detection com-
ponent checks the network traffic coming from a
particular VM for attack patterns. It also checks the
anomalous behavioral changes if any after consulting
its statistical behavior over a period of time which is
stored in VM profile db.
(3) Step 7 describes that the output of network intrusion
detection component is passed to alert and response
generation component if any anomaly or intrusion is
detected.
(4) In step 8, the response is sent to VM profile db;
the response includes increasing the ranking of a
particular attack pattern as its occurrence is found
and hence is more probable to come in future. Hence,
its rank needs to be updated, so that it will be searched
relatively earlier to ensure early detection of such
frequent attacks.
(5) Step 9 shows the outgoing traffic from network
intrusion detection component, if it is not containing
general attack patterns, specific attack patterns as
described by VM profile db and an anomalous traffic
behavior.
(6) Step 10 shows the incoming traffic received by net-
work intrusion detection component. This traffic
based on the VM is addressed and analyzed and
then passed to the virtual machine for which it is
meant. Any anomalous behavior is passed to alert and
response generation component.
(7) Step 11 shows the travel of the benign traffic to the
virtual bridge which is then transferred to the virtual
machine.
4. Results and Discussion
Currently, we have done a prototype implementation of
the proposed work in private cloud and have assessed its
effectiveness in terms of the network attacks it can prevent.
The details of its prototype implementation with advantages
are shown in the following subsections.
4.1. Prototype Implementation. The prototype implementa-
tion of the proposed work is in progress. We have analyzed
the design and started working over it. We are using Perl
5.2.14 as our programming platform for sniffing packets from
the virtual network interface of the Cloud network on the
privileged domain virtual machine. The private cloud setup
is using Open Nebula [43], and individual virtual machines
are running variety of OS including Windows 7, 32 bit and
Ubuntu 10. The traffic of all the VMs connected virtually
through virtual network interface is sniffed using Perl well-
known libraries for packet capture including Net: pcap [44]
and others. The data of individual VM is analyzed for attack
signatures present in attack signature db for prototype imple-
mentation; we have taken into consideration DDoS attack
scenarios with SYN flooding to provide a proof of concept.
The attack signature db contains signature as SYN packets
with parameter as maximum number of SYN packets per N
packets. This parameter is recorded during VM allocation
with normal run. The maximum number of packets per N
packets is from a collection of M runs of period of N packets
each. The VMs are analyzed for both incoming and outgoing
traffic packets for SYNpackets.The initial profile for eachVM
for detecting this attack is created based on the pattern found.
However, if during initial profile creation time it crosses some
predefined well-defined threshold then immediate actions
are taken during initial profile creation time only. In anomaly
detection stage, the normal traffic is analyzed for a specified
delta in the amount of TCP SYN packets in particular time
frame. If the delta increases, the profile is updated with the
value.
In the detection stage, the TCP SYN packets are looked
over every specified number of packets (N packets) to look
over the SYN pattern and its resemblance with the pattern
existing in the database for both incoming and outgoing
traffic. For the detection of suchDDOS attacks, we have taken
behavioral and statistical analysis as measure. Hence, we look
at the percentage change in the number of SYN packets. If the
scenario shows that their percentage is increasing with time
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Table 5: Current attacks and proposed scheme.
Cloud network attack VM profile based detection
DoS and DDoS [18]
SYN flooding attack (TCP SYN flood)
Smurf attack (ICMP flood)
Ping of death (ICMP flood)
Low-rate denial-of-service attacks (TCP’s
slow-time-scale dynamics of RTO)
(1) VM profile stores traffic behavior of incoming and outgoing traffics over a
period of time. It looks for attack patterns for flooding attacks such as TCP SYN and
ICMP and their counts in benign usage of virtual machine. For every DDOS attack
pattern, profile stores the threshold of attack packets per𝑁 packets. This threshold
obtained during normal VM behavior is then used during detection of DDOS
attacks.
(2) DDOS attack detection uses the threshold stored in VM profile database.
(3) Anomaly detection components updates attack signature db periodically, and
hence, network intrusion detection component can thwart such attacks concretely
for each VM.
(4) The attacks are identified and tackled in timely manner as they are ranked based
on the probability and frequency of such patterns found during initial profile
creation and anomaly detection stages.
TCP hijacking [16]
(1) VM inside the cloud environment can easily be checked for promiscuous mode
set and can be matched with VMs profiles which generally have this feature disabled
(2) The packet loss statistics of victim VM due to session hijacking will result in
anomalous behaviour which will be detected by the network intrusion detection
component.
Reused IP addresses [17]
The VM profile will have the IP address allocated to it. During each disconnection,
it is ensured by the centralized management component that the IP address of
disconnected VMmust not be directly given to a new VM or existing VM before a
certain period of time till all pending or ongoing connections shuts up.
DNS attacks [17]
(1) Privileged VMs having DNS control have a list of IP addresses that are allowed
to communicate with DNS services. This information is stored in VM profile.
(2) Hence, unauthorized communication with unrecognized IP addresses by either
Insiders or Outsiders will get detected and handled.
Network penetration [18]
IP random options, SMB session mixing,
TCP urgent pointer, and MSRPC object reference
(1) These signatures will get detected by the network intrusion detection system as it
runs common attack pattern signature matching for data coming from all VMs.
(2) Such well-known signatures are not VM specific and will get detected by
network intrusion detection system over traffic coming from all VMs, that is,
without consulting individual VM profile but through common attack signature
matching.
Fragmentation attack [19]
Tiny fragment attack,
overlapping fragment attack
As these attacks are also not VM specific they will get detected by the network
intrusion detection system through its general attack packet signature pattern
matchings.
Traffic analysis [20]
Deep packet inspection
(1) Traffic analysis of cloud network either as a whole or VM specific launched by
cloud user or insider VM can be detected; as for doing such operation they will set
to promiscuous mode which can be checked synchronously over cloud VMs.
(2) And if their profile have promiscuous mode as disabled the anomalous
behaviour will get detected.
Passive eavesdropping [21] Profile and promiscuous mode feature can detect such attempts.
Active eavesdropping [21]
Unidentified and unauthorized communication can be detected through VM
profile as it has trusted and frequently used IP addresses. Also profile and
promiscuous mode feature will detect such attempts.
we alert the subsystems to inform the admin about the sce-
nario and to take appropriate actions. Even if theDDoS attack
is through multiple sources from outside the cloud network,
we can stop it as we have the profile of a particular virtual
machine known to us, and hence, when a drastic change
comes up, such attacks are easily detected and can be resolved
by just notifying the VM user of anomalous happenings and
shifting him to some different IP address or by blocking the
communication from malicious IP addresses. And this will
not only detect attacks from malicious outsiders but will also
detect malicious insiders that are doing DDoS attacks and
can pinpoint the source if inside to cloud environment, as it
maintain, the profile of both incoming and outgoing traffics.
This is the prototype implementation of the concept; however,
the signatures for implementing fully functional prototype
are already analyzed, and the implementation for such an
intrusion prevention system is under progress. The result
will be analyzed in terms of speed of detection of DDoS
attacks compared to traditional schemes and the resources
required for detection in terms of computational and storage
complexity.
4.2. Advantages of Proposed Scheme. The proposed scheme
if deployed will provide security to well-known threats over
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network in cloud both from malicious cloud users, insiders,
and outsiders. Table 5 shows the description of cloud network
attacks and how theywill be handled by the proposed scheme.
5. Conclusions
This paper is focused on an approach of profile based
network intrusion detection for providing security to cloud
environment. It is a signature cum behavior based network
intrusion detection system. The concept is of creating a VM
profile db that will describe the attack patterns that needs to
be looked over on the VM specific traffic. The VM profile
db also contains the attacks in a ranked manner which will
ensure timely detection as the patterns will be searched in
the traffic in a ranked manner. The profile of a new VM is
created in VM profile creation stage where a VM is taken
into consideration for a specific amount of time for profiling
its behavior for detecting packet flooding attacks such as
denial-of-service attacks and also for finding such patterns
including others that can be possible in future from that
VM or over it, in the cloud network. The profile is updated
for new attack patterns and synchronizes attack patterns
parameters by anomaly detection component, whereas the
network intrusion detection system divides the incoming and
outgoing traffics and analyses the network for anomalous
behavior for attacks based on the individual profiles of
particular VMs. The intrusions are informed to alert and
response generation component that then takes necessary
actions such as responding to current malicious activities
taking place and updating the VM profile with new attack
or updating the ranking of attacks for timely detection. The
prototype implementation for detecting TCP flooding TCP
SYN flooding attack has been done, and the results show,
such concept of profile based detection can be applied for
detection of all known signature and anomalous behavior
based network attacks. The implementation of a complete
profile based network intrusion detection system is under
progress.
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